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∗ I would like to thank Mark Latham for helpful comments on an earlier draft. All flaws 
remain my responsibility. 1 Introduction 
„Why is it that so many of the important things are also the most boring?” 
(Ashleigh Brilliant) 
One dark and stormy night, a policeman came upon a man crawling on hands and 
knees near a street lamp. The policeman asked the man what he was doing. The 
clearly inebriated man explained that he was attempting to find his lost keys. The 
policeman, willing to help, asked where the man had lost the keys. The man 
pointed some way down the street, into the shadows. When the policeman asked, 
„Well then why are you looking for them here?” the man replied, „Because the 
light is better here.” 
The academic finance profession has taken a similar approach to the problem of 
risk management. In general, the academic literature has paid its attention to 
market risk and credit risk. The profession has ignored operational risk, a catchall 
term that includes inter alia, problems with information systems, operational 
problems, breaches in internal control, fraud, or unforeseen catastrophes such as 9-
11 or SARS. Market and credit risk lend themselves to interesting econometric 
and theoretical work. Operational risk is not theoretically interesting; it consists of 
unstructured and unsystematic practical problems best left to managers 
themselves. (The practioner literature has dealt with operational risk, at least 
occasionally. One typical example is Huntington (1996)).  
The finance literature has addressed some organizational problems under the 
rubric of the principal-agent problem. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) have a paper 
that analyzes venture capital contracts in which they have a useful short survey of 
the literature. However, none of the six types of problems that they describe 
covers the debacles in this paper. Unlike the situation in the „traditional” theories, 
in each of our stories, the acter’s1 incentives initally at least were aligned with 
those of their firms. Later, unlike the situation in the „stealing” theories the firms 
could have observed and verified cashflows had they chosen to do so. 
The academic management literature too has neglected operational risk. There are 
almost no articles dealing with misbehavior in organizations. One exception is 
Vardi and Wiener (1996). In their terminology, the three cases below all started as 
primarily Type O organizational misbehavior where the acter intends to benefit 
the organization. Of course, all also involved Type S misbehavior where the acter 
intends to benefit himself. Initially, the acters hoped that their success on behalf of 
the firm would advance their careers. If I may paraphrase the late Chairman Mao 
Tse Tung, in companies „Political power grows from the barrel of profits.” Later, 
                                                             
1 I have deliberately chosen the term “acter” as one who performs an action, in preference 
to “actor,” one who plays a part in a play. None of the individuals involved was playing a 
part, other  than perhaps that of a successful trader, and the events were no play. the acters attempted to protect their jobs by trying to undo the damage they had 
done. 
What Vardi and Wiener catch that the principal agent literature does not is the role 
of intent. The principal-agent literature abstracts from the difference between 
intent and outcome and assumes that acters intend and achieve their own benefit.2 
By contrast the Law is very concerned with both intent and outcome. Attempted 
murder is a crime. However killing a person may be homicide, manslaughter, or 
even justifiable homicide. Intent is critical. 
In none of the cases below did the acters initially intend to enrich themselves at 
the expense of the firm. Although all three situations involved fraud, none was an 
attempt at embezzlement. There is no sign even that the acters engaged in true 
gambles—trades with a negative expected value but large variance. The acters 
appear to have entered into trades that were at the very least fair bets, but which 
the acters thought, in triumphs of hope over experience, were bets with a positive 
expected value. 
Unfortunately, the experience of the last few years suggests that it has been 
operational risk that has been responsible for many of the largest debacles at 
financial institutions. Although I will not deal with the issue, even many dramatic 
cases of credit losses were, in essence, cases of operational risk. 
                                                             
2 This is similar to, but not identical with, the conspiracist literature. As Pipes (1997) points 
out, conspiracists assume that what occurred was intended and that the beneficiary intended 
the result. 2 Some examples of financial debacles 
„First rule of holes: when you're in one, stop digging.” 
 (Anon.) 
In the discussion below I will summarize three major debacles: the cases of 
Barings Brothers (loss: US$1.4bn, resulting in bankruptcy), Daiwa Bank (loss: 
US$1.1bn), and Sumitomo Corporation (loss: US$2.6bn). The total direct losses to 
the parent firms in these three cases amounted to US$5.1bn. Losses due to legal 
consequences probably increased the total by another 25%. However, losses in the 
form of funds embezzled by the acters probably amount to less than 0.2%. These 
debacles were not the result of individuals attempting to rob their employers. 
2.1 Barings Brothers 
Historical background (Kuprianov 1995): In 1762 the five sons of a Bremen 
merchant founded the eponymous company as a commodities trading house. Their 
services in helping to finance the Napoleonic wars earned all five knighthoods. 
Later the Bank handled French reparations after Waterloo, lent Thomas Jefferson 
the money to buy Louisiana, acted as financial agents for the US and Imperial 
Russia, and issued bonds for the Chinese and Japanese governments. Barings 
came close to bankruptcy in 1890 when its activities in Argentine railway bonds 
went awry. The Bank of England orchestrated a rescue because of the Bank’s 
importance to the City of London. At the time of the debacle I discuss below, the 
232 year-old Barings Brothers was the oldest British merchant bank and a pillar of 
the establishment in the City of London. 
The evolution of the debacle3: Nick Leeson grew up in a working class family in 
London and left school at eighteen. His first job was at Coutts & Co., an exclusive 
bank, where he started in 1985 as a clerk. He then joined Morgan Stanley where 
he learned to do the recording of the traders’ purchases and sales. In 1989 he 
joined Barings, still as a settlements clerk. In 1992 Barings offered him a position 
in Singapore where the firm was setting up a futures trading operation.  
Within the year, Leeson sat for and passed the exam to qualify to trade on the 
Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Shortly thereafter, the firm 
promoted him to general manager and head trader, but in a very limited capacity. 
Originally, his job was to arbitrage differences between futures prices and the cost 
                                                             
3 I have based this account on numerous press sources including (in no particular order) 
AsiaMoney, the New York Times, the Sunday Telegraph, the Daily Record, the Washington 
Post, and The Guardian, as well as the articles in the scholarly journals that I cite in the 
text. of the underlying basket (cash-futures arbitrage) by buying or selling futures on 
SIMEX at the request of Barings’ traders in London and Tokyo.4 
The job grew to include arbitraging discrepancies in prices between the Singapore 
and Osaka futures contracts. In principle, the business was low risk; Leeson would 
be buying the cheap contract and almost simultaneously selling the expensive one. 
Because the firm viewed the transactions as being of low risk, and to save costs, it 
permitted Leeson both to trade and to record his own trades. Also, because the 
price discrepancies he was arbitraging were small, to make a profit he had to take 
large positions. This activity developed into outright speculation. Leeson would 
take an open position where a buy was not matched with a sell or vice-versa. 
At some point Leeson created a new computer record, „Account 88888” to 
conceal losing transactions. He states in his book, Rogue Trader (Leeson 1996), 
that in July 1992, one of his staffers lost US$30,000 on a single trade; rather than 
fire the woman, he created the account to hide the loss. However, this is a self-
serving memory. The evidence suggests that he had already created and used the 
account. Leeson quickly developed a practice of openly recording successful 
trades, and booking losing trades to Account 88888. He further instructed his 
clerks not to report the account to London and manipulated the accounting records 
to minimize margin calls from SIMEX and to hide his activities. 
As a result of this selective reporting, Leeson’s apparent profits grew from about 
US$2mn in 1992 to about US$14mn in 1993. His bonus was £36K in 1992, 
£130K in 1993, and was to have been £450K in 1994. Peter Barings, the 
Chairman, expected to receive £1mn. Despite bragging to the contrary, there is no 
evidence that Leeson embezzled any funds.  
By the end of 1992, Leeson had accumulated a hidden loss of £2mn. In late 1993 
his losses increased by £21mn and in 1994 by £185mn. The cumulative loss at the 
end of 1994 was £208mn. In 1994 Leeson had started to take unauthorized options 
positions, particularly straddles (a simultaneous sale of a call and a put) on the 
Tokyo indexes. These earned him premium income that would be free and clear if 
the index did not move very much before the position expired, but that could 
result in large losses if the index fell or rose substantially.  
Unfortunately, on January 17, 1995, an earthquake struck Kobe. The Tokyo 
stockmarket fell sharply, and Leeson’s option position sustained losses of about 
£68mn. Leeson began buying stock index futures in an attempt to support the 
market. For a while he was semi-successful and his cumulative loss was only 
£253mn, but then the market started to fall again. He continued to buy more stock 
index futures and started selling bond index futures and Euroyen futures.  
                                                             
4 SIMEX had lower margin requirements than did the Osaka Securities Exchange though 
both offered futures contracts on the Nikkei 225 stock index and 10-year Japanese 
government bonds. Leeson and Barings were also dealing on the Tokyo International 
Futures Exchange and the Tokyo Stock Exchange. As the size of his position grew and his losses mounted, Leeson faced massive 
margin calls. He applied to London for the funds, using various pretexts and 
nonsensical justifications. London sent him a total of £742mn in several tranches, 
and a senior manager flew out to reassure SIMEX that Barings was aware of 
Leeson’s activities and would support him.  
As Barings started to check the accounts, discrepancies appeared. On February 23, 
Leeson disappeared with his wife. A shocked Barings acknowledged that total 
losses amounted to £927mn (including liquidation costs), a sum more than double 
the firm’s capital of £440mn. On February 26, the Bank of England put Barings 
into administration. Eventually ING Bank (Internationale Nederlanden Groep) 
bought the bank for £1, plus an infusion of £660mn to recapitalize the firm. 
Leeson was arrested in Frankfurt and extradited to Singapore, where he received a 
jail sentence of 6½ years. While in prison, he developed colon cancer and he was 
released after serving 4½ years. 
2.2 Daiwa Bank 
Historical background (Tamaki 1995): Nomura Tokushichi Co. began in Osaka 
in 1872, and by 1904 was firmly established in the modern securities business. In 
1918, after a re-organization, the Nomura Co. established the Osaka Nomura 
Bank, which it separated from the securities business in 1925. Later, in connection 
with other post-war reforms, the US Occupation forced the Nomura Bank to 
change its name to Daiwa Bank. Before and during the Second World War, the 
Nomura Bank was one of the eight giant zaibatsu banks. 
The evolution of the debacle5: Iguchi Toshihide6 was a dedicated employee at 
Daiwa Bank’s New York branch. He had come to the US after failing to qualify to 
enter a Japanese university. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Psychology from 
Southwest Missouri State University in 1975, and then worked briefly as a car 
salesman until his father pulled strings to get him a job at Daiwa. In 1976 he 
joined the bank, which offered him the job of a clerk in the securities deposit 
department because there was a vacancy there. 
Relatively soon, Daiwa promoted him to bond trader on the basis of his 
knowledge of securities, while still permitting him to retain his duties as clerk. 
First he would trade; then he would record his trades. Unusually, he recorded his 
trades manually on paper, not in a computer. In 1979 he became an executive vice 
president and head of government bond trading in New York, where he answered 
only to himself. Iguchi appeared to be a trustworthy employee whose commitment 
to Daiwa and his responsibilities led him never to take more than a two- or three-
                                                             
5 I have based the account on numerous press sources including the New York Times, Japan 
Economic Newswire, The Economist, Business Week, and the Financial Times. 
6 All Japanese names are in the Japanese order, surname first. day vacation. He was valuable to the Bank as his trading activities accounted for 
an apparent average of US$4 million in profits year after year.  
Because Daiwa had hired Iguchi in the U.S., it treated him as a long-term local 
hire. Had Daiwa hired him in Japan and seconded him to New York, he would 
have been subject to the rotation policy applicable to all Japanese managerial 
employees, and would have returned to Japan within three to five years. His long 
stay in his position, together with the rotation of the other Japanese managers, 
ensured that he had an expertise in the US government bond market that no one 
else in the bank could match. 
Unfortunately, in 1984 he made an error in forecasting the direction interest rates 
would take and made a US$50-200K loss (accounts differ). This amount was of no 
significance per se to Daiwa, with assets of around US$200bn, however the loss 
embarrassed Iguchi and he attempted to conceal it. The result was that Iguchi 
ended up spending the bulk of his career as a trader concealing the original loss 
while making ever more losses until the amount reached approximately US$1.1bn. 
To conceal his losses, Iguchi simply raided Daiwa's customer accounts. He would 
sell the bonds in the accounts and then forge documents to make it appear as if the 
customers had authorized the sale. As far as customers knew, they still had bonds 
in custody at Daiwa; as far as Daiwa knew, the customers had sold the bonds and 
received the proceeds. 
Daiwa’s own audits failed to reveal the problem. Bankers Trust New York was the 
custodian of the bonds, but although Daiwa's internal auditors had checked out 
their own New York branch several times since 1984, they never crossed-checked 
Daiwa’s records of its bond holdings with Bankers Trust’s records. The external 
auditors for the parent bank, Showa Ota (part of Ernst & Young) apparently did 
not examine the NY branch. An inspection in 1989, by the NY State banking 
authorities accompanied by a Fed examiner, detected nothing. Two cursory 
inspections, one in 1992 by examiners of the NY Fed and one in 1994 by visiting 
auditors from Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF), did not detect the fraud. The 
US examiners did order Daiwa to end Iguchi’s dual capacity as head of trading 
and as head of settlement. Iguchi apparently then chose to give up the better-paid 
and more prestigious position of head of trading to retain the position of head of 
settlements. This enabled him to continue to conceal his losses. 
Finally, unable to take the pressure, Iguchi confessed in a letter to the President of 
Daiwa Bank on July 24, 1996. Aware that they had failed to supervise him 
properly, Iguchi’s superiors made a further critical error of judgment: they 
dithered. After two weeks Daiwa informally notified MOF. MOF ultimately had to 
explain to the Fed why it had not instructed Daiwa to notify the Fed immediately. 
Instead, MOF kept quiet while Daiwa debated internally what to do. Finally, in 
early September, Daiwa formally notified MOF and the Fed. In November 1995 
Daiwa Bank was indicted in the US on charges of conspiring to hide the trading 
losses. The bank closed its U.S. operations (the Federal Reserve revoked Daiwa’s 
U.S. banking license) and paid $340 million, the largest criminal fine ever.  Eventually Iguchi himself went to jail for four years and was fined US$2mn. It 
also turned out that he had embezzled $500,000 for his personal use, an amount 
equal to some 0.045% of the total loss (not including the fine).  
2.3 Sumitomo Corporation 
Historical background (Noguchi 1979): Sumitomo Masatomo founded the 
Sumitomo merchant house in Kyoto in the 16
th Century. The firm took up 
smelting silver and copper after Sumitomo Masatomo learned the techniques from 
Western traders in 1591. By the third generation, the house had expanded into 
banking after opening a money-changing store in Osaka. Sumitomo rose to 
prominence when Sumitomo Tomoyoshi discovered the Beshi copper mines in 
1690. Later, Sumitomos also managed the Tokugawa’s Tachikawa copper mines.  
The evolution of the debacle7: In his heyday, Hamanaka Yasuo had the nickname 
“Mr. 5%”, reflective of the share of the world copper market that he supposedly 
controlled on behalf of his employer, Sumitomo Corporation. He also had the 
nickname “The Hammer,” a play on his name and on his ability to hammer the 
market. Sumitomo was proud of his stature in the markets and even featured his 
photo on the cover of one of its annual reports. 
Hamanaka joined Sumitomo in 1970, and in 1975 the company assigned him to 
the copper section of the non-ferrous metals division. In the late 1970s, the 
company sent him to London for a short period to learn the London Metal 
Exchange business through working as a clerk in tin and nickel. Thereafter he 
returned to Japan where he remained. Unusually for a management-track 
employee, he stayed in the copper section for the remainder of his career, rather 
than rotating to other parts of the firm. By 1983 he was selling 10,000 tons of 
copper per year. 
In 1984 he joined with Shimizu Saburo, then head of the copper trading team, in 
making unauthorized speculative futures transactions to try to sustain the section’s 
profitability. Unfortunately they were not successful, and to conceal their losses 
and protect their jobs, they entered into off-the-books deals.  
In 1987 Shimizu quit and Hamanaka took over the section. The losses at that point 
had climbed to about US$58mn. Losses continued to swell as Hamanaka began 
carrying huge positions on the London Metal Exchange (LME), despite drawing a 
warning from the Exchange over the volume of his trading. He next started 
dealing with Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch advanced him US$150mn, which 
enabled Hamanaka to make a payment elsewhere of US$100mn, and which led 
him to trade more via Merrill.  
                                                             
7 I have based the account on numerous press sources including Reuters, Agence France 
Presse, Business Wire, the Los Angeles Times, Japan Economic Newswire, AP, Purchasing 
Magazine, and The Daily Telegraph. In 1990 Hamanaka began borrowing money against Sumitomo’s copper stocks to 
fund his trading positions. He also began carrying out fictitious options trades to 
create an impression of trading success in management’s eyes and thus to garner 
further independence from oversight. 
In 1991 Hamanaka asked a US metals broker in London to issue a backdated 
invoice for fictious trades, reportedly worth about US$350mn. The broker notified 
the LME which notified Sumitomo. Sumitomo replied that Hamanaka had merely 
needed the invoice for tax reasons. 
In 1993 Hamanaka started dealing through Credit Lyonnais Rouse as his losses 
continued to mount following a plunge in copper prices. He borrowed US$100mn 
from ING Bank on the strength of forged signatures of senior managers. 
Sumitomo began an internal investigation that appears not to have lead to any 
immediate action. To raise funds, Hamanaka engaged in an unauthorized sale of 
put options to Morgan Guaranty Trust, but lost US$393mn on the options. 
In 1994 Hamanaka engaged in a further unauthorized sale of puts and calls via 
Morgan to raise US$150mn. This deal lost him US$253mn. To cover the loss, 
Hamanaka had Sumitomo Hong Kong borrow US$350mn from seven banks 
(including Sumitomo Bank). Later he arranged for Sumitomo Hong Kong to 
borrow again, this time about US$420mn, to pay Morgan. 
In 1995 the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the 
Securities Investment Board (SIB) in Britain launched investigations into unusual 
fluctuations in copper prices. Sumitomo reports that it cooperated and submitted 
all materials that the investigators requested. 
In March 1996 Sumitomo discovered that a statement from a foreign bank did not 
match the records in its Treasury Department. The bank had credited Sumitomo 
with funds from an unknown transaction. In early May, Sumitomo relieved 
Hamanaka of his trading duties; in early June Hamanaka confessed everything. In 
November Sumitomo announced that it had lost US$2bn in unauthorized trading 
in the six months to end-September. Total losses apparently were on the order of 
US$2.6bn. 
In November 1996 Hamanaka was charged in Tokyo with forgery and fraud. In 
March 1997 a court found him guilty on four counts of having forged the 
signatures of his bosses to keep secret his off-the-books trading, and of having 
swindled Sumitomo Hong Kong of US$770mn, for which he received a jail 
sentence of eight years. In a separate action, Sumitomo filed a civil suit accusing 
Hamanaka and his erstwhile boss Shimizu Saburo of having embezzled about 
US$7mn. This would amount to about 0.27% of the total losses.  
In 1998 Sumitomo Corporation paid a fine of US$150mn in the US and US$8mn 
in the UK to settle charges by the CFTC and SIB that it had manipulated copper 
prices. In connection with charges that it had aided Sumitomo in its illegal 
activities, Merrill Lynch agreed to pay a fine of US$15mn in the US and 
US$10mn in the UK. Neither firm admitted nor denied any wrongdoing. In June 1999 Sumitomo filed suit against Chase Manhattan Bank (in the US) and 
UBS A.G. (in Tokyo), for about US$760mn. The suit charges that the banks 
provided Hamanaka loans disguised as “copper swap transactions” to enable him 
to continue his illicit trading activities. 
In July 1999 Sumitomo filed suit against Credit Lyonnais Rouse (in London) for 
about US$300mn. The suit alleges that Credit Lyonnais dishonestly assisted 
Hamanaka and/or procured a breach of his employment contract. 
In August 1999 Sumitomo filed suit against Morgan Guaranty Trust (in New 
York) for about US$735mn in compensatory damages, as well as punitive 
damages, and treble the amount of compensatory damages under the federal civil 
RICO statute. The suit charges that Morgan knew or should have known that 
Hamanaka lacked the authority to engage in the transactions that it arranged with 
him. The suit alleges that Morgan engaged in a usurious loan of US$535mn, 
disguised as a complex copper derivatives transaction, to support his illicit trading. 
When the derivatives matured, Hamanaka was forced to pay US$1.2bn, for an 
effective interest rate of 150%. The suit further alleges that Morgan took its pledge 
of confidentiality to Hamanaka to a ridiculous and unlawful extreme, by actively 
assisting him in keeping his transactions hidden not only from the outside world, 
but also from his superiors at Sumitomo. Keith Murphy, the Morgan Managing 
Director associated with the Hamanaka transactions and named in the suit, 
resigned in the wake of the scandal. Morgan has stated that it will contest the suit 
which it described as being without merit. 3 Conceptualizing debacles and their prevention 
„Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. Three times is enemy action.” 
(Winston Churchill) 
The point of the above quote from Winston Churchill is that at some point we 
must acknowledge that financial debacles are not random events but rather may be 
the outcome of systematic influences. However, the systematic influences are 
managerial rather than financial.  
First, none of the debacles I have discussed above was the result of financial risk 
in the sense that what occurred was simply a „100-year flood,” i.e., a rare draw 
from the extreme tail of a known distribution of possible outcomes. Furthermore, 
Grammatikos et al., (1986) found that for a „representative [U.S.] bank,” the risk 
of ruin from foreign currency activities was approximately zero when they judged 
it in comparison with the capital available to cushion such risks. 
Second, as Tickell (1996) points out with respect to Barings, the problem was not 
a melodramatic case of hubris and of an upstart flying too high. Their firms 
permitted Leeson, Iguchi and Hamanaka to continue to trade not because they 
actually had demonstrated trading ability but because they had created an 
impression of ability by hiding their incompetence. Lastly, Kuprianov (1995) 
makes clear also with respect to Barings, that the problem was not a complex 
derivatives strategy some of whose ramifications no one understood. In all three 
cases, derivatives were only the instruments that the traders used to implement 
rather simple bets. In each case, the essence of the problem was unauthorized 
trading that the culprit undertook to enhance his firm’s profitability and therefore 
his own career and pay. 
Third, the problem was probably not due to a failure of early warning systems. I 
would argue that it is not unambiguously clear that the firms could have limited 
the damage. In all three cases there were hints at some earlier stage of possible 
problems, hints that the firms or outside regulators did not pursue. However one 
cannot make too much of this. The folk saying „Hindsight is 20-20” is apropos. 
Heuer (1978) has an accessible article on hindsight analysis, and cites research 
showing that ex post assessments of ex ante probabilities exhibit a strong upward 
bias. That is, an event that has happened appears much more obviously likely than 
it did at the time. In practice, signals usually turn out to be false positives. 
Launching full-scale investigations each time someone detects a hint of an 
anomaly would cripple a firm. 
Fourth, the problem was preventable. Hogan (1997) is absolutely correct in 
identifying a failure of governance both within the firm and on the part of the 
regulators as the source of the debacle at Barings. I would maintain the same is 
true in the cases of Daiwa Bank and Sumitomo Corporation. In all three cases, the 
debacle was the result of unauthorized trading. However, as Huntington (1996) 
points out, for this to occur, two things must come together. First, circumstances within the firm must exist or have been created that permit the fraud. Second, 
people within the firm must allow the fraud to happen. We will return to these 
points in a moment. 
Huntington argues that three managerial trends have increased the scope for fraud 
in firms: matrix management, decentralization and the encouragement of 
managerial entrepreneurialism. Of these, decentralization and the encouragement 
of entrepreneurialism are the most relevant to our three cases. Together, these 
have the effect of giving managers the authority and the incentive to seek out 
profit opportunities. 
In the cases of Barings, Daiwa Bank, and Sumitomo Corp, the trading function 
was tailor-made for problems. In all three companies, trading was relatively 
remote from the firms’ main activities so the firms decentralized authority to trade 
to specialist managers. Furthermore, Tickell’s and Hogan’s accounts make clear 
that Barings in particular was trying to become more aggressive and more daring. 
In the other two, the firms tolerated daring even if they did not actively promote it. 
It is not an accident that in all three cases the problem was with the manager of the 
operation, not his subordinate. The discretionary authority was at that level, not at 
a lower level.  
Trading is an area where classic hierarchical or bureaucratic management is 
particularly inappropriate. When Zaheer (2002) studied foreign exchange dealing 
rooms in New York and Tokyo, she found that differences between Japanese and 
Western firms in their internal organization affected risk-taking behavior and 
profit. All the Japanese trading rooms followed a bureaucratic-clan control 
structure, while Western firms followed a market control structure. The 
bureaucratic-clan firms tended to hire at entry level, had low bonuses relative to 
base salary, and used positions limits extensively to control trading positions. The 
market control firms hired experienced traders, had large bonuses relative to 
salary, and used few or no position limits. 
The market control trading rooms produced higher profits per trader, although the 
positions were no larger on average than in bureaucratic clan trading rooms. 
Zaheer reports that professionalism, measured by a trader's commitment to a 
career in trading rather than a career in banking, was unrelated to risk-taking but 
positively related to profit performance. The bureaucratic clan system is consistent 
with a generalist personnel system; the market control system is consistent with a 
specialist personnel system. Of the two approaches or administrative technologies, 
the market control system appears to produce better performance, but depends 
critically on the enforcement of safety rules for control. 
Unfortunately, as Dörner (1997) in his book on system failure points out, breaking 
safety rules frequently pays off. Safety rules constrain behavior in ways and to 
levels that are generally well below crisis stage. By ignoring the rules the acter 
gains an increased freedom of action that generally yields an improved immediate 
result with no immediate adverse consequences. Permitting the same individual 
both to trade and to record the trades permitted two relatively small operations, Daiwa NY and Barings Singapore, to save the costs of a skilled settlements clerk 
who would have had relatively little to do.  
Fifth, what made the situation worse is that trading as a function is particularly 
prone to the problem that in an earlier work (Tschoegl 1995) I referred to with the 
metaphor of Odysseus and the Sirens' song. Homer’s Odyssey has one of the 
earliest examples of solutions to the problem of management becoming enraptured 
with a course of action and becoming blind to the course’s disastrous 
consequences. Odysseus’ solution was to have his crew bind him to the mast and 
to put wax in their ears. These measures freed him to hear the song and enjoy it 
but left him unable to steer his vessel towards the Sirens and the rocks on which 
they sat. If Odysseus had not plugged his crew’s ears, all would have enjoyed the 
Sirens’ song and all would have been well until the last moment when the boat 
smashed upon the rocks. In our context the Sirens’ song of dramatic profits was so 
alluring that it led managers to bask in the music and to suspend their critical 
faculties. This is Huntington’s point that fraud occurs when managers let it occur. 
We find many examples in both corporate and political governance of 
mechanisms that are the equivalent of binding oneself to the mast. We see crude, 
rigid rules such as limits on banks’ authority to lend more than a percentage of 
their capital to a particular borrower, or in the political realm, limits on a 
President’s right to succeed himself. Under the economists’ usual assumption of 
rational actors, these rules are an anomaly. Of course, rules may improve on 
judgment when we do not have the information necessary for judgment; this is 
Milton Friedman’s argument for rule-based monetary policy. However, the 
problem of the Sirens’ song is subtler. It is not that we do not have the information 
we need for discretion to be better than rules. Rather, we recognize that we may 
find ourselves in situations like those facing the unfortunate mariners in Homeric 
Greece. We can become enraptured, ignore what we otherwise would know, and 
destroy ourselves. So, like Odysseus, we bind ourselves to the mast; the firm 
imposes rules that prevent managers from giving even a trader with an apparently 
“hot-hand” a free hand. 
This recognition that our actions are not always rational offends against the central 
assumption of modern economics, that acters are rational utility maximizers. This 
is a powerful assumption and one that leads to useful theories. However, it is an 
assumption about aggregate or normal behavior. The cases I described do not 
represent normal behavior in the sense that we observe them occurring frequently. 
While not unheard of, debacles are arguably still rare. 
If I may pursue the metaphor of the Sirens’ Song a little further, it is interesting to 
note that Odysseus’ solution had two parts. His arrangements ensured that he 
could hear but not steer, and that the crew could steer but not hear. Odysseus made 
sure that those who imposed the constraints, i.e., tied him to the mast, and who 
could therefore untie him, were not subject to the same influences as he was. In 
our context of the management of firms, it is important that those who ultimately 
impose the rules not be responsive to the same influences as those to whom the 
rules apply.  Now let me switch to a less literary and perhaps slightly more formal model. The 
following simple model from Koford and Tschoegl (1999) takes as its base a 
Gibrat model (Gibrat 1931; Sutton 1997) of the growth of the firm. I assume the 
following model of the growth of the firm’s assets: 
ln At+1 = µ + ln At + εt 
where ln At is the natural logarithm of the assets at time t, µ is the expected growth 
of the assets, and εt is the firm’s overall luck. Luck depends on many factors and is 
equally likely to be good or bad. The model therefore takes luck as having a 
Gaussian distribution with mean (0) and variance (σ
2). On average, the firm’s 
assets grow as the managers pick projects with positive expected profitability. 
However, luck may bring growth that is above or below expectations. If the firm’s 
luck is bad enough, assets may decline. Furthermore, the firm can increase its 
assets by borrowing. This gives rise to a third parameter of interest: ∆t —the 
amount by which the firm’s assets exceed its liabilities. 
The probability that the firm will go bankrupt depends on µ, σ
2 and ∆ t. The firm is 
insolvent when liabilities exceed assets (∆t < 0). The firm’s expected first passage 
time to the point of insolvency increases with µ and ∆t, and decreases with σ
2. The 
more profitable the firm the less likely it is that it will go bankrupt within any 
given period. Equally, the less risky the firm the less likely that it will go 
bankrupt. Lastly, the less levered the firm, the less likely it is that it will go 
bankrupt.  
Managers care most about µ, and relatively little about σ
2 and ∆t. The managers’ 
salary, responsibility and perquisites increase in µ, and there are compelling 
reasons for why this should be so. Furthermore, when the managers’ 
compensation depends in large part on bonuses, as they did for example at 
Barings, then the manager will welcome a large σ
2. Bonuses are a call option on 
profits and the value of the call increases with σ
2. Interestingly, it is not clear in 
our three cases that the senior managers who failed to prevent the debacles 
suffered financial or career harm despite their culpability for their passivity. 
One of the roles of the governance system is to compensate for managers’ 
asymmetric concern. The principal losers in our dramas were the shareholders of 
Barings, Daiwa, and Sumitomo; they should have the most interest in effective 
monitoring of managers. Hogan discusses the particular problems with Barings’ 
governance growing out of the firm’s ownership with non-voting shares in the 
hands of the Barings Foundation (UK-registered charity) and the voting shares in 
the hands of senior management. The Japanese firms, too, were subject to 
governance problems that I discuss more fully in Tschoegl (1995). Walter (1992) 
has characterized the Japanese system as an ultra-insider system in which control 
rests in the hands of firms linked to each other by cross-holdings of shares. There 
is no market for control—obviating such a market is one of the purposes of the 
cross-holdings—so the only remedy left to outside shareholders is exit, to use 
Hirschman’s (1979) powerful and evocative terminology.  
Even in less extreme situations than those of Barings or major Japanese firms, current governance systems are subject to a critical weakness. Dispersed 
shareholders face a large free-rider problem in taking action individually. The 
board of directors is supposed to act in the owner’s collective interest but there are 
likewise agency problems in the relationship between owners and directors. 
Latham (1998) has an innovative proposal that aims at increasing director loyalty 
to shareholders.8 The essence of the proposal is the development of firms that 
would be in the business of competing with each other to propose slates of Boards 
of Directors that shareholders then could choose among. However, the firms do 
not exist and the scheme is not yet in place at any firm. 
Furthermore, historical evidence suggests that one cannot rely on disclosure with 
shareholders (or their representatives) making independent assessments of µ and 
σ. Apparently, in some circumstances a community of opinion, or information 
cascade, may form (Bikhchandani et al., 1992 and Orléans 1995) that can lead 
shareholders, together with managers, to overestimate µ and underestimate σ.  
For such cases a remedy is to develop parties that have more of a stake in σ
2 and 
∆, and less of a stake in µ. For instance, banking regulators have a great concern 
that the banks that they regulate not go bankrupt. This means that the regulators 
have relatively little concern with µ but a much greater concern with σ
2 and ∆. The 
concern with ∆ manifests itself as a requirement for capital adequacy. The concern 
about σ
2 leads the regulators to enforce a bank’s own safety rules. However, it is 
critical that the regulators act in ways that one might characterize as bureaucratic 
rather than flexible, i.e., to favor rules over discretion. 
As we have discussed, in the cases of Barings and Daiwa, the banks failed to 
implement and enforce the necessary safety rules and the regulators also did not 
catch the problem in time. In the case of Sumitomo, there were no regulators with 
a vested interest, however, there were banks that lent to Sumitomo. Banks, when 
acting as creditors, like regulators, have relatively little interest in µ and relatively 
more in σ
2 and ∆t. Unfortunately, Sumitomo was so large relative to the loans that 
Hamanaka negotiated that the lenders were able successfully to forego careful 
credit analysis and vetting. 
The suits by Sumitomo against the bankers that lent Hamanaka the money seem to 
assert that the banks involved not only had an obligation to their own shareholders 
to assure the safety of the loans, but an additional obligation to monitor the 
legitimacy of the borrower’s loan request. I do not know enough about the law to 
know whether this is a novel legal theory or not. The cases now pending will 
probably settle whether it is a viable one. 
                                                             
8 See also the Corporate Monitoring website at http://www.corpmon.com/publications.htm 4 Conclusion 
„We have met the enemy and he is us!” 
 (Walt Kelly’s comic strip Pogo) 
Several articles analyzing the Barings debacle from different perspectives have 
appeared in the scholarly literature. The Daiwa and Sumitomo debacles have 
drawn less attention, perhaps because they are newer and perhaps because they are 
less accessible. Still, I have drawn on all three of these cases to make an 
essentially simple point about risk management. 
Risk management is a management problem. The debacles were not random 
events and they were not unfortunate draws from a known distribution of 
outcomes. They were all the result of a failure of governance that grew out of the 
nature of the activities themselves and out of the nature of human beings. 
Preventing such debacles in the future will require improvement in governance 
mechanisms. However, firms must root the necessary mechanisms in an 
understanding of human nature. The assumption of acters’ rationality is 
analytically a powerful one; that does not mean that it well describes behavior 
under stress or when sailing within earshot of Sirens. 
Furthermore, the mechanisms must be part of a system, part of which resides 
outside of the firms themselves. To return to the metaphor of Odysseus and to the 
model again for a moment, the persons responsible for tying Odysseus to the mast 
must be unable to hear the music; the people who are responsible for restricting σ
2 
and ∆ must be separate from those responsible for achieving µ.  
Finally, I have two conjectures for further research. First, I suspect that it is 
possible to set up systematic tests for whether or not a trader has ability at position 
taking. As Merton (1980) pointed out, one can improve one’s estimates of the  
variance of a process (such as a trader’s position) by increasing the frequency of 
observation. This does not work for expected value. Estimating expected value 
simply requires the passage of time. Still, in an earlier paper (Tschoegl 1987) I 
drew on work by by Wald (1947) and Brown (1971) to suggest a rationale for stop 
orders and so-called „psychological” barriers in financial markets. One could use 
the same methodology to test for traders’ ability. If Henriksson and Merton’s 
(1981) work on fund managers is any guide, I suspect that few traders will be able 
to demonstrate ability that would pass the usual tests of statistical significance. 
Demonstrating this might lead managers to being more cautious in granting 
discretion. Furthermore, it would also help managers to determine when a trader 
was achieving an improbable level of success, meriting further investigation. 
Second, I suspect that such profits that do accompany position taking are 
disproportionately due to trading with counterparties that are not constrained by 
the need to be profitable, i.e., central banks (Szakmary and Mathur 1997), 
fraudulent institutions such as BCCI, and unauthorized traders such as the ones we 
have examined above. The extremely limited evidence on the sources of trading profits in foreign exchange trading at banks suggests that most of the profits come 
not from position taking but from market making (Ammer and Brunner 1997; 
Lyons 1998). Still there is some profit at the banks and perhaps even more so 
among their clients such as hedge funds. This then raises the question of whether 
improved management among all firms implies a much reduced role for position 
taking in financial markets. Alternatively, lessons learned may fade, leading 
managers to set aside rules whose origins and rationale are lost in time, until a new 
debacle teaches an old lesson again.  Postscript: Allied Irish Bank  
„This is like deja vu all over again.” 
 (Yogi Berra) 
Historical Background: Allied Irish Bank (AIB) is the result of the merger in 
1966 of three Irish banks, the oldest of which, Provincial Bank, was established 
in 1825. AIB entered the US in 1977 with an office in New York. In 1983, 
seeking to expand at a time when Ireland’s economy was flat, AIB bought First 
Maryland Bancorp. AIB initially took a minority stake but in 1988 bought all 
remaining shares.  In 1999 First Maryland became AllFirst Bank. AllFirst had an 
explicit strategy of expanding into contiguous states; it bought banks in 
Washington, DC, Pennsylvania, and Maryland and opened branches in northern 
Virginia. AIB was the smallest of the parents of the ten largest US subsidiaries or 
affiliates of foreign banks and in 2000 AllFirst represented 25 per cent of AIB’s 
total assets, the largest proportion for any of the parents (Tschoegl 2002).   
The evolution of the debacle9:  John Rusnak came to First Maryland from 
Chemical Bank in 1993. He had graduated from Bucknell University in 1986 and 
then worked for First Fidelity Bank in Philadelphia. He worked briefly at 
Chemical but apparently left because he did not like the pressure. Rusnak was a 
native of Pennsylvania, where his father was a steelworker and his mother 
registered death certificates for the state. In 2002 Rusnak was 37 years old, 
married with two children and "a respected member of his local community." 
Apparently his salary was $85K a year, a modest amount for a currency trader 
with his experience. He also received annual bonuses averaging about US$200K. 
Because AllFirst was just a small regional bank, the foreign exchange business for 
customers accounted for only about US$10mn per annum in revenue. Rusnak was 
one of just two traders in the foreign exchange trading room. He made proprietary 
trades - i.e., he bought and sold currencies to make a profit for the bank - while his 
colleague conducted transactions for bank clients.  
Later investigation showed that between 1997 and 1999 Rusnak lost about 
US$104mn. He may have hid his early losses in part by using a trading practice 
called historic rate rollover, which enables a trader to defer recognition of his 
losses. The practice is not illegal, but its repeated use should signal to others in the 
market that something suspicious is going on. By 1999, Rusnak had begun using 
"prime brokerage" accounts with several banks, chiefly Bank of America and 
Citibank, that allowed him to conduct currency trades under their names. Though 
Rusnak could conduct dozens of trades, from Allfirst's accounting perspective the 
transactions amounted to one trade with the prime broker.   
In 2000 Rusnak lost another US$207mn. To avoid detection, Rusnak entered false 
option contracts that showed his positions as being protected from large losses. 
                                                             
9 I have based this on numerous press reports and Harrington and Lawton (2003). These false contracts were with banks in the Far East; time zone differences 
impeded what was already an incompetent surveillance process at Allfirst. Later, 
to conceal his losses Rusnak generated premium income by selling options that he 
did not enter on the bank’s books. In 2001 Rusnak lost US$380mn. In early 2002 
the deception began to unravel when management, concerned at the cash Rusnak 
was starting to require, decided to look at his trades. 
Aftermath: AIB’s first organizational response to the debacle was to centralize all 
trading in Dublin.  Then to determine the total losses AIB had to contact 70 banks 
around the world and check thousands of transactions. AIB also replaced Allfirst's 
top management, sending in executives from Dublin to take control. In mid-2002 
Susan Keating, AllFirst’s President and CEO, resigned and AIB accepted 
Chairman Frank Bramble’s pre-existing request for early retirement. 
In May 2003 AllFirst sued Bank of America and Citicorp, alleging that the banks 
lent Rusnak $200mn disguised as the proceeds of his foreign exchange trades and 
“carefully tailored their reporting to Allfirst to omit information concerning 
Allfirst's profits and losses”. Both banks dismissed the suit as being “without 
merit.” 
Lastly, also in 2003, AIB merged Allfirst into M&T Bank Corporation in return 
for a 22.5% stake in M&T, which is headquartered in Buffalo, New York. M&T 
operates banks in Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. The sale 
negotiations had begun before the scandal broke. 
Analysis: Several issues emerge as noteworthy in this case. First, a US subsidiary 
that is large relative to the parent poses many managerial challenges, one of which 
is the problem of managing the US managers’ desire for independence. As 
Rosenzweig (1994) points out, one approach is to give the subsidiary a great deal 
of autonomy. 
AllFirst’s trading team reported to AllFirst management, rather than being 
integrated with AIB’s trading in New York and Dublin. Although AIB used the 
Crossmar Matching Service, it allowed AllFirst not to. Crossmar, a subsidiary of 
Citigroup, provides an automated foreign-exchange and securities trade-
confirmation system to about 1,000 banks, corporations and fund-management 
companies. Both parties to a trade enter each transaction. On average the system 
responds within two minutes, either confirming the trade or notifying the parties if 
the particulars are incongruent. Thus the system prevents a trader from entering 
phony counterparty trades.  
A second issue that emerges in this case, as in the other cases in the chapter, is that 
frequently other market participants have suspicions that something may be 
wrong. Some of the reports of suspicions are a case of hindsight bias (Heuer 
1978).  Still, Goldman Sachs apparently refused to deal with Rusnak. Other 
traders remarked on the surprising volume of deals that a trader at a small regional 
bank was doing, though some had assumed that Rusnak was trading on AIB’s 
behalf. Unfortunately there is no norm of senior officers passing on apprehensions to each other. One wonders what would have happened in an earlier, clubbier 
time, or if AllFirst’s or AIB’s headquarters had been in New York or London? 
Finally, an issue one needs to keep in mind in deciding how much to expend on 
prevention is that for a well-diversified shareholder, rogue trading causes little 
loss. Allfirst’s losses accrued to other widely held banks. There is leakage: some 
of the gainers are privately held hedge funds and the like, traders receive bonuses 
not for skill but merely for taking the opposite side of the incompetent rogue 
trader’s orders, and shareholders suffer deadweight losses of bankruptcy, should 
that occur, as it does on occasion such as in the case of Barings. Still, as Krawiec 
(2000) points out, the cost-benefit analysis of preventing losses to rogue traders 
may not yield an unambiguous conclusion. References 
Ammer, J.; Brunner, A.D. (1997): „Are banks market timers or market makers? 
Explaining foreign exchange trading profits”, Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions & Money 7:43-60. 
Bikhchandani, S.; Hirshleifer, D.; Welch, I. (1992): „A Theory of Fads, Fashion, 
Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades”. Journal of Political 
Economy 100:992-1026. 
Brown, R. G. (1971): „Detection of turning points in a time series”. Decision 
Sciences 2:383-403. 
Dörner, D. (1997): „The Logic of Failure”. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Gibrat, R. (1931): „Les inegalités économiques”. Paris: Recueil Sirey. 
Grammatikos, T.; Saunders, A.; Swary, I. (1986): „Returns and Risls of U.S. Bank 
Currency Activities”, Journal of Finance 41 (3):671-682. 
Harrington, D.G.; Lawton, T.C. (2003) „The Internationalization of Allied Irish 
Banks”. ECCH Case 303-015-1. 
Henriksson, R.D., and R.C. Merton (1981): „On Market Timing and Investment 
Performance. II. Statistical Procedures for Evaluating Forecasting Skills”, 
Journal of Business 54 (4):513-33. 
Heuer, R.J., Jr. (1978): „Cognitive Biases: Problems in Hindsight Analysis”. 
Studies in Intelligence 22 (2):21-28. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1979): „Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations and States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 
Hogan, W. P. (1997): „Corporate Governance: Lessons From Barings”. ABACUS 
33 (1):26-48. 
Huntington, I. (1996): „Fraud: the unmanaged risk”. Capital Market Strategies 9 
(March):30-36. 
Kaplan, S.N.; Strömberg, P. (2003): „Financial Contracting Theory Meets the 
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts”, Review of 
Economic Studies 70 (2):281-315.  
Koford, K. and A.E. Tschoegl (1999): „Problems of Bank Lending in Bulgaria: 
Information Asymmetry and Institutional Learning”, MOCT-MOST: Economic 
Policy in Transitional Economies 9 (2):123-152. 
Krawiec, K.D. (2000): „Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader 
Mystery”, Oregon Law Review 79 (2):301-339. Kuprianov, A. (1995): „Derivatives Debacles: Case Studies of Large Losses in 
Derivatives Markets”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 
81 (4):1-39. 
Latham, M. (1998): „Corporate Monitoring: New Shareholder Power Tool”, 
Financial Analysts Journal 54 (5):9-15. 
Leeson, N. Whitley, W. (1996): „Rogue Trader”, London: Brown, Little. 
Lyons, R. K. (1998): „Profits to Position Control: A week of FX Dealing”, 
Journal of International Money and Finance 17 (1):97-115. 
Merton, R.C. (1980): „On Estimating the Expected Return on the Market: An 
Exploratory Investigation”, Journal of Financial Economics 8 (4):323-61. 
Noguchi, T. (1979): „The Formation of the Japanese Zaibatsu - The Political 
Merchant in the Original Accumulation of Capital”, Keio Business Review 
(16):169-187. 
Orléan, A. (1995): „Bayesian interactions and collective dynamics of opinion: 
herd behavior and mimetic contagion”, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 28:257-274. 
Pipes, D. (1997): „Conspiracy”, New York: Free Press. 
Rosenzweig, P.M. (1994): „The New “American Challenge”: Foreign 
Multinationals in the United States”, California Management Review 36 
(3):107-123.  
Sutton, J. (1997): „Gibrat’s Legacy”, Journal of Economic Literature 35: 40-59. 
Szakmary, A.C.; Mathur, I. (1997) „Central bank intervention and trading profits 
in foreign exchange markets”, Journal of International Money and Finance 16 
(4): 513-535. 
Tamaki, N. (1995): „Japanese Banking: A History, 1859-1959”, Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. 
Tickell, A. (1996): „Making a melodrama out of a crisis: reinterpreting the 
collapse of Barings Bank”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
14:5-33. 
Tschoegl, A.E. (1987): „The Source and Consequences of Stop Orders: A 
Conjecture”, Managerial and Decision Economics 9 (1):83-85. 
Tschoegl, A.E. (1995): „Comment”, in Corporate Decision Making in Canada, 
Daniels, R.J.; Morck, R. (eds.) Calgary: Univ. of Calgary. 
Tschoegl, A.E. (2002): „FDI and Internationalization: Evidence from US 
Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks”, Journal of International Business Studies 33 
(4): 805-815. 
Vardi, Y.; Wiener, Y. (1996): „Misbehavior in Organizations: A Motivational 
Framework”, Organization Science 7 (2):151-165. Wald, A. (1947): „Sequential Analysis”, New York: John Wiley. 
Walter, I. (1992): „The Battle of the Systems: Control of Enterprises and the 
Global Economy”, Journal of International Securities Markets 6:309-317. 
Zaheer, S.A. (2002): „Acceptable Risk: A Study of Global Currency Trading 
Rooms in the US and Japan”, in Zenios, S.; Harker, P. (eds.), The Performance 
of Financial Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University, Ch. 15:462-495. 
 